Tag Archives: Malta

Sunday, 2 November 1941

Operation BULLSEYE: Gibraltar to Malta

F/Lt Jackson and P/O Austin continue their expedition the following night. Austin takes off from Gibraltar at 21.15, still with his crew of six plus two ground crew to service the aircraft. Jackson takes off at 21.00.

Austin sets course ENE-ish from Europa Point, the southern tip of Gibraltar, for a position about eight miles off Cabo de Gata (Cape of the Cat, now a National Park), the most south-easterly point of Spain and their last pinpoint before reaching the North African coast. They continue eastwards to a pinpoint off Algiers, but alter course slightly southwards to avoid a thunderstorm, and back again to resume their original course. At 00.36 they reach position off Algiers by ETA, and set course for a position further east. Astro sights taken through the intermittent higher cloud layer indicate they are too far north. With no D/F or radio stations to triangulate on, they set course to 146 degrees to intercept the coast. At 02.55, off to port they spot the light of the lighthouse at Cape Bon. Flying to the light, which they reach at 03.22, course is set for a point off the Tunisian town of Monastir. From there they set course for Malta; at 04.34 they fly on track over the small Italian island of Linosa (which provides a convenient checkpoint) and Gozo is seen ahead at 05.03. Austin orbits Filfla Island, a tiny islet to the south of Malta, at 05.07, and half an hour later circle the airfield at Luqa. Receiving no acknowledgement, they head back to their position off the south coast to keep out of the way of the air raid that is occupying the airfield’s attention, and they eventually land at 06.05.

Jackson’s report says that the towns on the north African coast were well lit up, and made navigation easy.


TNA AIR 20/8334, Encls. 100A, 103A

Tuesday, 4 November 1941

RAF Luqa, Malta

Three Wellingtons arrive from Egypt. They have attempted, but failed, to find their pinpoint in Yugoslavia, where they were to have dropped an agent and several containers. Jackson’s report states:

Instructions arrived from HQ Middle East that the Wellington Captains were to transfer their loads to the Whitleys who were to attempt the operation.

My orders from D.D.I. (Deputy Director of Intelligence) before leaving England were that I was not to carry out operations other than those for which we had been sent toMalta to do without permission from Air Ministry. I ascertained from Army H.Q. at Malta that the Wellington operations had nothing to do with us, but that the equipment and personnel for our operations would arrive that night by flying boat and submarine. I informed the Station Commander and the S.A.S.O. of the above facts, and they decided that I was to await the arrival of the flying boat and submarine.

This gets Jackson, a junior officer up against some very independently-minded seniors, out of a tricky spot. In any case, as he points out, there is not enough time to transfer the loads from the Wellingtons and re-pack the containers. Not to mention that, if the Wellingtons’ loads were to be dropped in the Whitleys’ containers, Jackson’s own operation would have to be scrubbed.


TNA AIR 20 / 8334, encl. 103A

Friday, 7 November 1941

This night is a busy one for the squadron: one Lysander pickup operation for SIS, one Whitley operation to Holland, consequential for SOE; another to Yugoslavia, a first; and the squadron’s first Halifax operation to Poland, flown by a Polish crew. The night is a heavy one for Bomber Command: it is a ‘maximum effort’ against Berlin, Mannheim, Cologne, Essen and Ostend. 392 aircraft set out, 37 do not return; many are casualties of bad weather over the North Sea.


In the RAF argot of the era, Nesbitt-Dufort’s second attempt at this operation is a ‘piece of cake’. He takes off an hour later than last night, at 9.20 p.m. (GMT+1), possibly because the moon rises about 40 minutes later. Following the same R/T procedure with the south-coast radar stations, he crosses the French coast between Criel-sur-Mer and Le Treport at 8,000 feet, pinpoints at Compiègne, picks up the target lights inside seven minutes, and lands three minutes later in a field a couple of kilometres WSW of Soissons, close to the village of Ambleney.

He is stationary on the ground for about two minutes and twenty seconds, during which time the A.3. (Belgian section) agent SAGA is disembarked with his luggage, and Claude Lamirault (FITZROY) and Roger Mitchell (BRICK) are embarked with theirs. Take-off and the journey home are uneventful, and Nesbitt-Dufort crosses the French coast a little east of Le Treport. He is given homing instructions by MUNGA and lands back at Tangmere at 20 minutes after midnight, just three hours after take-off.

FITZROY and BRICK are both returning to the UK for debrief and a brief respite from the clandestine life: they will be dropped back on 8 December as CLAUDIUS and BERYL. Roger Mitchell, who has recently stood in for Roman Garby-Czerniawski as head of INTERALLIE during the latter’s own visit to London in October, will be on hand to assist in the assessment of the fallout from the capture of the INTERALLIE circuit in ten days time, specifically to interpret the bogus messages received from Mathilde Carré in her new guise as VICTOIRE, purportedly having evaded capture in the roundup.

Operation CATARRH

This operation has the most grave consequences for SOE, for the agents parachuted are Thijs Taconis and Huub Lauwers. Their capture will trigger the Dutch tragedy known as ‘Der Englandspiel’, the luring of several dozen agents to immediate capture, some to their eventual death.

From F/Lt Murphy’s report, there is nothing portentous about the operation: Murphy and his usual crew, with two Leading Aircraftmen aboard as despatchers, cross the Suffolk coast at Southwold. Half an hour later, over the North Sea, two aircraft close to within 500 yards, but Murphy loses them by turning sharply to port. Flying under a dense bank of cloud they cross the Dutch coast at Ymuiden and fly over the Zuiderzee to Meppel, reaching it at 23.57. From there they fly south-east to the target near Ommen, where they drop the two agents shortly after midnight. They return to Meppel, retracing their outward route, dropping leaflets along their homeward route from 100 feet up — only possible over Holland!

The story of Lauwers and Taconis is too well-known for me to repeat in detail. Lauwers was captured in March 1942 at his set, and was forced to transmit. He used his security-check, but this was ignored by SOE’s Dutch section, which transmitted details of agents to be parachuted. These were met by Major Herman Giskes of the Abwehr and his team. Soon Giskes had lured several agents and their W/T sets to Holland; in essence, he came to run SOE’s activities in Holland until he tired of the game in 1944. The RAF had ceased operations to Holland several months before, due to unreasonable losses.

I recommend reading MRD Foot’s ‘SOE in the Low Countries’ and Leo Marks’s ‘Between Silk and Cyanide’ for the British side of the story, and Herman Giskes’ ‘Operation North Pole’ for the German Abwehr’s side of the story. (Early editions of the Giskes book may also have Huub Lauwers’ own account in an appendix.) Giskes was a highly-experienced operator: before his posting to the Netherlands in October 1941 he’d had considerable success in Paris by infiltrating British-sponsored intelligence organisations.

Operation BULLSEYE (Yugoslavia)

On the morning of the 7th the submarines have arrived in Malta — probably sneaking in during the previous night — with the equipment for Jackson and Austin to drop over Yugoslavia. Jackson attends a morning conference chaired by the SASO, with two Army officers, the two experienced Serbian pilots who are to act as navigation guides, the officer i/c/ the Wellington Flight. The Serbian pilots claim that the winds in the mountains at this time of year make the operation too hazardous by night, and the Wellington Flight commander states that the pinpoints would be impossible to find. A signal was to be sent to the Air Ministry saying that any attempt would be made by day.

Only two containers are ready for dropping. Jackson has three crew off sick. Austin thinks a night attempt is feasible: he volunteers to make an attempt that night, and takes Jackson’s Z9158 up for a test flight at 11.00. He takes off for Yugoslavia at 21.50, and sets course for his first turning-point at Saseno (Sazan) Island, at the entrance to the Adriatic. The next pinpoint is at Cap Bodoni (Cape of Rodon), on the coast further north. From there he heads inland to Mitrovice, in modern-day Kosovo. Cacac is the final pinpoint, with the target in the nearby hills to the north-east.

In the event the weather is fine, with isolated cloud over the sea up to 6,500 feet. Austin flies at 10,000 feet to keep well above any high ground. The three or four signal-fires are clearly visible. Austin signals with the letter ‘R’, which is returned, and several more fires are lit. A green flare is fired from some fires in the form of a cross indicating the wind-direction. At 02.56 the containers are dropped from 3,600 feet to keep the Whitley well above the terrain; at this distance from base their instrument-height may be considerably inaccurate. The rear gunner sees a parachute open.

Austin and his crew immediately make their return to Luqa, arriving at 07.15, and they land 25 minutes later.

Operation RUCTION

RUCTION is the first operation to Poland carried out by an all-Polish crew, so there is a lot riding on it. General Sikorski has pushed hard for the Polish Home Army and underground to be supplied from the air by Polish crews. The aircraft are still British, but there is no doubt that, had Sikorski not agitated strongly for four-engined aircraft, 138 Squadron could have whistled in vain for the Halifax. The bomber is still very new: so far only No. 35 Squadron had been equipped with the type. On 23rd October the Poles have been sent to Linton-on-Ouse for three days’ Halifax conversion-training.

The agents are: Capt. Niemir Stanislaw Bidzinski (ZIEGE), 2/Lt Napoleon Segieda (WERA), and Lt Jan Piwnik (PONURY). There is no operation report on RUCTION, because the crew deliberately crash-lands in Sweden, near Tormelilla. Their version is that they have dropped their agents over Poland when the hydraulic system fails and the undercarriage is lowered. The crew cannot raise it. By now over Denmark, the crew realise that, with the undercart locked down there is no prospect of the Halifax making it back across the North Sea, so they turn towards neutral Sweden, and crash-land. The crew is taken into custody by the Swedish authorities, and they are eventually repatriated to the UK.

W/Cdr Farley’s comments on the operation, contained in an exasperated letter to the Air Ministry after another operation to Poland in January, is revealing:

It has now been established that the loss of the first aircraft was due to mishandling. Colonel Rudowski (sic), who accompanied the crew against orders, did not fully understand the undercarriage system. They have stated that they could not raise the undercarriage as there was no emergency hand pump. There is, of course, a hand pump and the fluid could have been lost only by leaving the selector in the “up” position instead of the “neutral” position during the flight.

As the Poles’ Commanding Officer, Farley has every right to enquire why one of his squadron’s rare and precious Halifaxes has come to a sticky end on its first operation. Though at the time of writing he has yet to fly the Halifax on operations, he will have familiarised himself with his squadron’s aircraft. He also has an experienced Halifax pilot in Sqn Ldr Ron Hockey, who has (by the time Farley writes this report) flown the ANTHROPOID operation at the end of December, and has a thorough knowledge of the Halifax’s controls and systems.

In his ‘Poland, SOE and the Allies’, Josef Garlinksi does not mention this episode, despite its importance.


TNA AIR 40/2579: Lysander Operations, 419 Flight & 138 Squadron.


TNA AIR 20/8334, Encl. 104A


TNA AIR20/8334, Encls 97A, 103A


TNA AIR 2/5203, Farley letter to DDI2 dated 13 January 1942.

Sunday, 9 November 1941

RAF Luqa, Malta

The two agents due to be parachuted into Yugoslavia have arrived in the early morning by submarine. However, they have not been provided with parachutes, a rather essential item of equipment. (Aircrew parachutes, possibly the only types available on the island, are very different in construction from either the agents’ ‘A’-type or the paratroop ‘X’-type, and their canopies would be too small.) In any case the weather forecast for the next few days is not good, and the Station Commander cancels operations for the night; he does so again on the 10th.

Monday, 10 November 1941

RAF Luqa, Malta

F/Lt Jackson and P/O Austin receive orders to return to the UK. One Whitley is undergoing a 40-hour inspection, and poor weather over the UK prevents the other from leaving; on a direct route from Malta the two Whitleys will be near the limit of their endurance, with little margin for error given the navigation problems of flying across the Mediterranean before crossing a hostile France.


TNA AIR 20/8334. Encl. 103A